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ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Aileen McHarg 
Introduction 
What is variously referred to as administrative, informal, or tertiary rule-making, administrative quasi-
legislation, or soft law  W in other words, the adoption by government agencies of rules, policies, or 
guidelines without express statutory authorisation  W is a pervasive feature of contemporary 
governance.  DeƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇDĞŐĂƌƌǇŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂƐĂ ‘ƌĞĐĞŶƚĂĐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?,1 by 1986, Baldwin and Houghton 
ĚĞƚĞĐƚĞĚĂ ‘ĚŝƐĐĞƌŶŝďůĞ QƌĞƚƌĞĂƚĨƌŽŵƉƌŝŵĂƌǇůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚďǇŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůƌƵůĞƐ ? ?2 
such rules being used to perform a multiplicity of functions.3  Since then, administrative rule-making 
has continued to proliferate  W fuelled by the increasing scale and complexity of modern government, 
ƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨ ‘EĞǁWƵďůŝĐDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĚĞŵĂŶĚƐŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ĂŶĚ
greater concern for equality and transparency.4 
Increased administrative rule-making was famously advocated by the American jurist Kenneth Culp 
Davis in his seminal text Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, first published in 1969.5  Whilst 
recognising the frequent necessity and desirability of administrative discretion, Davis nevertheless 
regarded unnecessary discretion as the major source of bureaucratic injustice, and therefore argued 
that steps should be taken to confine, structure, and check discretionary powers wherever possible.  
His key recommendation was for administrators themselves to confine and structure their discretion 
through the adoption of plans, policy statements, rules, open precedents and so on, even in the 
absence of delegated legislative powers, and that the courts should encourage them to do so.6 
ĂǀŝƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶ influential in United States (US) administrative law.7  In the United Kingdom 
(UK), however, academics have tended to be critical of a presumption in favour of rules,8 while the 
starting point in legal doctrine for the analysis of administrative rule-making has been the insistence 
that discretion must be retained.  This finds expression in the rule that administrative decision-makers 
exercising discretionary powers must not fĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĞŝƌĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ-ĨĞƚƚĞƌŝŶŐƌƵůĞ ? ? ?   
The no-fettering rule does not mean that administrative rule-making is not permitted at all.  Since the 
landmark case of British Oxygen Co Ltd v Minister of Technology,9 the courts have generally been 
tolerant of the adoption of policies, or even rules, provided that the decision-maker is prepared to 
depart from them in appropriate cases.  This in turn has paved the way for judicial regulation of rule-
making and rule-application, particularly (though not exclusively) through the doctrine of legitimate 
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expectations.  Nevertheless, the no-fettering rule is still applied by the courts, albeit in a somewhat 
unpredictable fashion, and despite its apparent inconsistency with the protection of legitimate 
expectations.  Regulation of rule-making is similarly patchy and incomplete, and largely parasitic upon 
other administrative law doctrines, rather than being subject to comprehensive control as an 
administrative activity in its own right. 
In fact, control of administrative rule-making has long been regarded as one of the least satisfactory 
aspects of UK administrative law.10  In 1994, Baldwin claimed that  ‘ƚŚĞũƵĚŝĐŝĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚĞƌƚŝĂƌǇ
ƌƵůĞƐ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶ ?ŵĂƌŬĞĚďǇĂĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉŐƵŝĚŝŶŐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨƌĞĂůƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ? ?11 producing serious 
legitimacy problems and clear potential for unfairness.  In recent years, however, there have been 
signs of a significant shift in judicial attitudes.  There have been important developments in two main 
respects.  First, judicial regulation of rule-making is becoming increasingly elaborate, and is beginning 
to break free of its conceptual anchors in other administrative law doctrines.  Second, in isolated cases, 
ũƵĚŐĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ ƚŽ ĨŽůůŽǁ ĂǀŝƐ ? ĂĚǀŝĐĞ ĂŶĚmandate the adoption of rules.  Indeed, 
ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽůůŝŽƚƚĂŶĚsĂƌƵŚĂƐ ? ‘ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐŽĨĂ “ŶŽĨĞƚƚĞƌŝŶŐƌƵůĞ ?ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽǁƐƉĞĂŬŽĨ
 “ĨĞƚƚĞƌŝŶŐƌƵůĞƐ ?ŽƌƚŚĞ “ůĂǁŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ŵŽƌĞďƌŽĂĚůǇ ? ?12  This, however, seems premature, since  W as I 
argue below  W the case law still lacks coherence, and a clear, principled account of the conditions of 
legitimate administrative rule-making.  
The time thus seems ripe to re-examine legal control of administrative rule-making  W a topic which, 
despite some important contributions,13 has been relatively neglected by academics.  This article has 
two aims.  First, it analyses the development of the case law since British Oxygen Co, identifying the 
ways in which judicial control has changed, and where gaps in the law still remain.  Second, it proposes 
an alternative approach to the judicial control of administrative rule-making.  This approach 
distinguishes (a) the question whether administrative decision-makers should adopt rules and (b) the 
regulation of rules once the decision has been made to employ them, arguing that the no-fettering 
rule should be abandoned, and that instead much greater emphasis should be placed on regulating 
administrative rules.  In making that distinction, I attempt to deal with the tension between the desire 
for general standards of judicial control (both to guide decision-makers and to constrain judicial 
intervention), on the one hand, and the need for sensitivity to the variety of forms that administrative 
decisions may take and contexts in which they may arise, on the other hand.  The difficulty of striking 
the right balance between generality and contextual sensitivity is one which arises throughout judicial 
review, but it seems to occur in a particularly acute form in relation to administrative rule-making.14   
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Judicial Control of Administrative Rule-Making: the Current Law and its Development 
The No-Fettering Rule 
In their classic comparative study of US and UK administrative law, Schwartz and Wade wrote that: 
The American conception is that discretion, whether judicial or administrative, should in all 
possible cases be exercised in accordance with rules ascertainable in advance and that the 
policy to be applied should somehow be fixed or standardised. The British conception is that 
within its legal limits administrative discretion must be free, and that the object of policy 
should be to produce the best solution as it may appear at any particular time.15 
The British presumption in favour of retaining discretion is expressed in the no-fettering rule, which 
in its classic form performed two distinct, though related functions.  First, it sought to ensure that 
individual cases were treated on their merits; second, it promoted administrative flexibility, enabling 
decision-makers to adapt to changing circumstances and priorities (subject only to general constraints 
of legality and reasonableness).  While the rule did not preclude the adoption of policies or guidelines 
for the exercise of discretionary powers, it meant that they could only have limited legal significance.  
For administrators, policies could not be treated as rules to be applied in an automatic fashion; it was 
necessary to keep an open mind about their application to particular cases.  For citizens, 
administrative pronouncements could not be relied upon, as it was open to administrative agencies 
to change their mind. 
Both aspects of the no-fettering rule have come under pressure as a result of developments in judicial 
review, with the consequence, I argue, that its role has changed from being a doctrine which preserves 
administrative discretion to one which regulates the development and application of administrative 
rules. 
1. Individuation 
The classic statement of the no-fettering rule is Bankes LJ ?ƐĚŝĐƚƵŵ in R v Port of London Authority ex 
p Kynoch:16 
There are on the one hand cases where a tribunal in the honest exercise of its discretion has 
adopted a policy and, without refusing to hear an applicant intimates to him what its policy is, 
and that after hearing him it will in accordance with its policy decide against him, unless there 
ŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ ? QKŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĐĂƐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞĂƚƌŝďƵŶĂů
has passed a rule, or come to a determination, not to hear any application of a particular 
character by whomsoever made.  There is a wide distinction to be drawn between these two 
classes. 
The significance placed on hearing the applicant emphasises the distinction being drawn between a 
power to legislate and the exercise of discretion.17  In ƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚƐŝŵƉůǇ
                                                          
15 B. Schwartz and H. W. R. Wade, Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in Britain and the United 
States (Clarendon Press, 1972) 106. 
16  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?< ? ? ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ?dŚĞƌƵůĞŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŽůĚĞƌ PƐĞĞ<ŽƐƚĞůůŽ ? ‘dŚĞ^ĐŽƉĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
ZƵůĞŐĂŝŶƐƚ&ĞƚƚĞƌŝŶŐŝŶĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>YZ  ? ? ? 
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formulate rules of decision-making and then apply them rigorously to situations as they arise, but 
ŵƵƐƚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĐĂƐĞ ? ?18  Indeed, 
on some accounts, the no-fettering rule was treated as an aspect of the right to a fair hearing.19 
Kynoch suggests that, short of adopting a binding rule, administrators could give considerable weight 
to their policy pronouncements.  But in fact, in the case law both before and after Kynoch and in the 
academic literature, there was disagreement on this question.  Attitudes ranged from a complete 
rejection of the legitimacy of placing conditions on the exercise of free discretions,20 via the view that 
a policy was acceptable, but to be treated as no more than a relevant consideration to be taken into 
account in reaching a decision in an individual case,21 to the position that decision-makers were 
entitled to have and apply their policies provided that they were prepared to consider making an 
exception in an appropriate case.22 
This uncertainty was largely laid to rest by British Oxygen Co, which is now regarded as the leading 
authority on the no-fettering rule.  ĨƚĞƌƋƵŽƚŝŶŐĂŶŬĞƐ>: ?ƐĚŝĐƚƵŵŝŶKynoch, Lord Reid went on to 
say: 
I see nothing wrong with that.  But the circumstances in which discretions are exercised vary 
enormously and that passage cannot be applied literally in every case.  The general rule is that 
ĂŶǇŽŶĞǁŚŽŚĂƐƚŽĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĂƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶŵƵƐƚŶŽƚ ‘ƐŚƵƚŚŝƐĞĂƌƐƚŽĂŶĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? Q ? 
I do not think there is any great difference between a policy and a rule.  There may be cases 
where an officer or an authority ought to listen to a substantial argument reasonably 
presented urging a change in policy.  What an authority must not do is refuse to listen at all.  
But a Ministry or large authority may have had to deal already with a multitude of similar 
applications and then they will have almost certainly evolved a policy so precise that it could 
well be called a rule.  There can be no objection to that, provided the authority is always willing 
to listen to anyone with something new to say  W of course I do not mean to say that there 
need be an oral hearing.23 
WĞƌƌǇŚĂƐƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶŶŽƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ
ƌƵůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ?24  However, British Oxygen Co is rightly regarded as a landmark case for 
several reasons.  First, it laid to rest any lingering doubts about the legitimacy  W indeed the inevitability 
 W of administrative rule making.  Second, it confirmed that officials were entitled to apply their policies, 
                                                          
18 Galligan (1990), above n13, at 22. 
19 See, eg, Galliga (1976) above n13, at 347, who notes that in some early cases the characterisation of the 
decision as ju, icial, and therefore carrying a duty to hear, was more important than the analysis of discretion 
and policies.  See also Costello, above n16, at 355.  This conceptual linkage is rare in modern discussions, but 
for exceptions see Lord Woolf et al, ĚĞ^ŵŝƚŚ ?Ɛ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůZĞǀŝĞǁ(7th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2016) para 9.003; 
ĂŶĚĚĂŵWĞƌƌǇ ? ‘dŚĞ&ůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇZƵůĞŝŶĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>: ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƐĞĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌďĞůŽǁĂƚ ? ? ? ? 
20 eg Hyman v Rose  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƐĞĞZ&s,ĞƵƐƚŽŶ ? ‘WŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶŝŶ>ŝĐĞŶƐŝŶŐĂƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
MLR 353 at 354. 
21 R v Rotherham Licensing JJ ex p Chapman (1939) 55 TLR 718; Stringer v Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government [1970] 1 WLR 1281; Lavender & Sons Ltd v Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1970] 1 
WLR 1281. 
22 eg Boyle v Wilson [1907] AC 45; Kynoch, above n16; R v Torquay Licensing JJ ex p Brockman [1951] 2 KB 784; 
anĚƐĞĞ^ĚĞ^ŵŝƚŚ ? ‘WŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶŝŶ>ŝĐĞŶƐŝŶŐ&ƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D>Z ? ? ? 
23 Above n9, at 625. 
24 Perry, above n19, at 379. 
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subject only to considering whether an exception ought to be made in a particular case.  Third, it 
significantly downplayed the requirement to hear cases individually, even where an exception was 
being sought.25  British Oxygen Co thus represents an important shift away from an insistence upon 
individuated decision-making towards a system in which, as Lord Reid put it,  ‘if the Minister thinks 
that policy or good administration requires the operation of some limiting rule, I find nothing to stop 
Śŝŵ ? ?26  In other words, it marks a shift from an assumption that the existence of discretion prohibits 
administrative rule-making to an essentially permissive approach. 
>ŽƌĚZĞŝĚ ?ƐĚŝĐƚƵŵŝƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂůƐŽŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶĂ fourth respect; namely, in emphasising the varying 
circumstances in which discretions are exercised.  Indeed, while the no-fettering rule has continued 
to be applied since British Oxygen Co, and policies are sometimes struck down for excessive rigidity  W 
either on their face or, more challengingly, because of the way in which they are applied in practice27 
 W its operation remains highly variable.28  In fact, I suggest that, in practice, the no-fettering rule now 
operates, not as a general presumption either for or against the legitimacy of administrative rule-
making, but rather than a means of judicial control over the degree of structuring of discretion that is 
appropriate in particular contexts.  At times, a high degree of flexibility and a genuine consideration 
of the merits of particular cases is required; at other times, rules are allowed, even where they permit 
of few or no exceptions.   
In assessing the degree of structuring that is permissible, courts appear to be influenced both by the 
substantive nature of the decision to be made and by its administrative context.  As to the former, for 
instance, cases involving child welfare seem to demand a high degree of individuation, because of the 
overriding importance of ensuring that decisions are made in the best interests of the child.  Thus, in 
Attorney General ex rel Tilley v Wandworth BC,29 the Court of Appeal struck down a council resolution 
that no assistance with housing was to be provided under the Children and Young Persons Act 1963 
to families with children where the parents were intentionally homeless.  Indeed, Templeman LJ 
considered that even a policy which had been hedged around with exceptions would not have been 
entirely free from attack.30  By contrast, the courts have accepted that certain policy objectives would 
be undermined if policies could not be applied strictly.  For example, in R v Nottingham CC ex p 
Howitt,31 a policy of banning taxi-drivers who had been found guilty of plying for hire without a licence 
                                                          
25 See in particular per Viscount Dilhorne ,[1971] AC 610 at 631.  
26 Above n9, at 624. 
27 ^ĞĞ:^<ŶŝŐŚƚ ? ‘&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌ&ĞƚƚĞƌŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Judicial Review 73, at pp 78  W 80, who distinguishes 
between fettering in law and fettering in fact. 
28 See PP Craig, Administrative Law (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2016) 537  W 538; HWR Wade and CF Forsyth, 
Administrative Law, (11th edn, Oxford University Press, 2014) 270  W 276. 
29 [1981] 1 WLR 854. 
30 See also R (Q) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 1151, [2001] 1 WLR 2002 
(policy of separating female prisoners from their babies when the latter reached 18 months had to be applied 
flexibly); R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Venables and Thompson [1998] AC 407 
(sentencing tariff policy for child murderers too inflexible).  A high level of individuation has also been required 
in relation to the exercise of judicial discretion to grant extensions of time on equitable grounds (Dunn v Parole 
Board [2008] EWCA Civ 374) and in relation to the calculation of discretionary housing payments for disabled 
people (R (Hardy) v Sandwell MBC [2015] EWHC 890 (Admin)), both of which are contexts involving 
considerable fact-sensitivity. 
31 [1999] COD 530. 
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could lawfully be enforced strictly with few exceptions because this was necessary to provide an 
effective deterrent.32 
As to administrative context, Wade and Forsyth note a distinction between situations involving a high 
volume of similar cases, and those where applications are fewer and more variable.33  We see in British 
Oxygen Co itself an acceptance that in areas of high volume decision-making it is simply unrealistic to 
expect administrators to act other than through rules, and that to insist on the possibility of making 
an exception is likely to become a mere formality.34  Thus in R (S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire,35 
an 11 year old boy who had been charged with, but subsequently acquitted of, an offence was unable 
to challenge a general policy of retaining fingerprint and DNA samples because it was regarded as 
unrealistic and impractical to require each case to be examined individually.  Harlow and Rawlings also 
note that the no-fettering rule is particularly difficult to apply in the context of automated decision 
processes.36  By contrast, in R v Greater London Council ex p Bromley LBC,37 the GLC had unlawfully 
fettered its decision by regarding itself as being bound to implement a promise contained in the 
ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŽ ƚŽ ƌĞĚƵĐĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚ ĨĂƌĞƐ ? ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚŝƐ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĞĚ ŝƚ ƚĂŬŝŶŐ
account of the full range of factors relevant to what was an important, one-off policy decision. 
As the Bromley case indicates, assessments of the appropriateness of following rules or policies 
perhaps inevitably shade off into assessments of the substantive merits of the decisions or policies 
under challenge themselves.  For example, R (S) v Home Secretary38 involved a Home Office decision 
to delay consideration of older asylum applications in order to meet targets set for handling more 
recent applications.  The Court of Appeal held this to be a  ‘textbook ĐĂƐĞ ?of unlawful fettering, as the 
policy precluded individual cases from being considered on their merits.  However, the policy might 
equally have been attacked for irrationality, since the aim of setting a target was to speed up decision-
making, not to introduce further delays in dealing with cases not subject to the target.  Similarly, 
Galligan criticises the decision in Sagnata Investments Ltd v Norwich Corp,39 that a policy of refusing 
to license amusement arcades was an unlawful fettering of discretion, as confusing the substantive 
legality of the policy (for negating the statutory power conferred upon the council) with the question 
whether the policy had been applied correctly.40   
This tendency to fuse the question of the appropriate degree of structuring of discretion with the 
substantive merits of the decision under attack is reinforced by the fact that cases attacking policies 
for excessive rigidity now often do so both under the common law no-fettering rule and under the 
Human Rights Act (HRA), as amounting to a disproportionate interference with Convention rights.  The 
proportionality principle has been said to reinforce the no-fettering principle where human rights are 
engaged.41  The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has sometimes condemned so-called 
                                                          
32 See also Nicholds v Security Industry Authority [2007] 1 WLR 2067 (a policy of refusing to license as security 
guards people found guilty of certain offences was necessary to achieve the relevant statutory purposes). 
33 Above n28, at 276. 
34 See above n9, per Viscount Dilhorne at 631.   
35 [2004] UKHL 39. 
36 Above n4, at 218. 
37 [1983] 1 AC 768, per Lord Wilberforce at 829E-F and Lord Brandon at 853A-B. 
38 [2007] EWCA Civ 546. 
39 [1971] 2 QB 614. 
40 Galligan (1976), above n13, at 352  W 353.   
41 Elliott and Varuhas, above n12, at 178; Wade and Forsyth, above n28, at 275  W 276.  
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 ‘ďůĂŶŬĞƚƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ĂƐŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƚĞŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌ ŶĐĞƐǁŝƚŚŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƌŝŐŚƚƐĂƐƚŚĞǇŵĂǇĨĂŝů
to secure a fair balance between rights and other legitimate aims in the circumstances of particular 
cases.  ^ƚƌĂƐďŽƵƌŐ ?ƐĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐďůĂnket ban on voting by convicted prisoners in Hirst v 
UK42 is a very well-known example.43  But the ECtHR clearly does sometimes accept that rules are 
appropriate,44 and recent decisions in the UK courts have been reluctant to condemn them.  In fact, 
as with other aspects of the proportionality assessment, what seems to matter is, not how the 
decision-maker has approached the decision, but rather the substantive proportionality of the 
decision itself.  Thus, in R (Bibi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,45 the Supreme Court 
held that, although the application of guidance concerning when the non-British spouses of foreign-
born British citizens who were entitled to reside in the UK should be entitled to accompany them could 
lead to violations of the Convention, this did not make the rule itself unlawful.46   
More generally, the balance struck by a rule or policy between Convention rights and competing 
legitimate aims may itself be regarded as proportionate ĞǀĞŶ ŝĨ ŝƚ ĚƌĂǁƐ  ‘ďƌŝŐŚƚ ůŝŶĞ ? Ěistinctions 
between situations which are included or excluded.  Moreover, decision-makers will be entitled to a 
degree of deference in deciding how and where the balance is to be struck.47  For example, in R (Tigere) 
v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills,48 the Supreme Court held unanimously that a 
rule requiring students to be lawfully ordinarily resident in the UK for three years before being eligible 
for student loans was not in breach of Article 2 of the First Protocol to the Convention.  However, the 
court was split on the proportionality of ĂĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚďĞ ‘ƐĞƚƚůĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ
UK on the date of application;  ‘ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ? ďĞŝŶŐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ĂƐ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ŝŶĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞ ĂŶĚ ŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇ
temporary leave to remain.  The majority thought that the inflexible application of the settlement rule 
was not proportionate on the facts of the case, because Tigere had been living in the UK since the age 
of six and was unaware of, and not responsible for, the fact that her mother had never sought to 
regularise their immigration status, whereas the minority were inclined to defer to the immigration 
authorities.  All the judges nevertheless seemed to be aware of the necessity and value of having rules, 
and both Lord Hughes in the majority, and Lords Reed and Sumption in the minority, pointed out that 
ƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂƌƵůĞĂƐĂ ‘ďůĂŶŬĞƚƌƵůĞ ?ǁĂƐƚĂƵƚŽůŽŐŽƵƐĂŶĚŶŽƚŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨĂƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?49   
Thus, the HRA does not appear to have reversed the tendency since British Oxygen Co for judges to 
emphasise the benefits of structuring discretion through rules.  Indeed, as will be discussed further 
below, it may in fact have encouraged it. 
  
                                                          
42 (2006) 42 EHRR 41. 
43 See also S and Marper v UK (2008) 48 EHRR 1169; R (GC) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2011] 
UKSC 21. 
44 See, eg, Animal Defenders International v UK (2013) 57 EHRR 21. 
45 [2015] UKSC 68. 
46 See also R (MM) (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10; R (Agyarko) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 11. 
47 See R (T) v Greater Manchester CC [2013] EWCA Civ 25; R (Tigere) v Secretary of State for Business, 
Innovation and Skills [2015] UKSC 57.  N.b., the Court of Appeal in T warned that a rule which was not 
proportionate in substance would not be saved just because it was convenient.   
48 Ibid. 




Changing judicial attitudes to the legitimacy of administrative rule-making have also had implications 
for the second aspect of the no-fettering rule: the preservation of administrative flexibility.  The 
distinction between legislative and discretionary powers which underpinned the classic conception of 
the no-fettering rule implied that administrative rules or policies could not, of themselves, create 
binding legal effects.  If pre-determined policies were only permitted to play a limited role in decision-
making, and the interests of affected parties were in any case protected by the requirement to treat 
each case on its merits, then policies could not reasonably regarded as generating any expectations 
about the content of decisions such as to justify an obligation to follow them.50  However, if officials 
are allowed to rely on administrative rules or policies as sufficient justification for their decisions, with 
only limited opportunities for affected parties to dispute their application, there is an obvious 
imbalance if the latter are not entitled to enforce them.  ƐŚŵĞĚĂŶĚWĞƌƌǇƉƵƚŝƚ ? ‘ ?ŝƚ ?ŝƐƵŶĨĂŝƌĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐďŽĚǇƚŽĂĐƚĂƐŝĨŝƚĂůŽŶĞŝƐĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŽŝŐŶŽƌĞƚŚĞƌƵůĞƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐǇŽƵƌŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?51 
At one time, the legal effect of administrative rules largely52 depended upon whether or not they were 
classified as legislative in character.  This was a somewhat elusive distinction, which turned not only 
upon their source in an explicit grant of rule-making power, but also upon their drafting and content,53 
and which gave rise to an inconsistent and unsatisfactory body of cases.54  Today, however, the 
importance of the legislative/administrative distinction has been substantially undermined by the 
development of the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectations.  This is turn has had significant 
implications for the scope and function of the no-fettering rule.   
The earliest cases to uphold substantive, as distinct from procedural, legitimate expectations made 
ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇůŝŵŝƚĞĚŝŶĐƵƌƐŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŽĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ ?ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵƚŽĚĞƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?In R v Liverpool 
Corporation ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators Association55 and R v Home Secretary, ex p Khan,56 
although the courts were prepared to protect the apƉůŝĐĂŶƚƐ ?ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ-
announced policies would be followed, the protection afforded was procedural only; namely a duty 
to hear the applicants before departing from the policy (and, in Khan, an obligation to justify the 
decision through reasons).  This approach could be regarded as being compatible with at least the 
spirit of the no-fettering rule insofar as it forced the decision-maker to confront and to justify a 
decision to depart from pre-announced policy in the circumstances of the particular case.  In other 
words, it reinforced the pre-British Oxygen Co concern to ensure that cases are treated on their merits, 
and the earlier conceptual linkage between the no-fettering rule and the right to a hearing. 
However, as Ruddock57 demonstrated, procedural protection for substantive legitimate expectations 
was not always sufficient.  Here, although the case failed on its facts, it was held that the applicants ? 
                                                          
50 Cf Elliott & Varuhas, above n12, at 175. 
51 &ŚŵĞĚĂŶĚWĞƌƌǇ ? ‘dŚĞŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽĐƚƌŝŶĞŽĨ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>: ? ? ? 
52 They could sometimes be given some effect as a relevant consideration which the decision-maker was not 
entitled to ignore  W eg JA Pye (Oxford Estates Ltd) v West Oxfordshire DC and Secretary of State for the 
Environment [1982] JPL 557. 
53 P Cane, Administrative Law (5th edn, Clarendon Press, 2011) 52. 
54 See Galligan (1976), above n13, at 344  W 345; Baldwin and Houghton, above n2, at 246  W 252. 
55 [1972] 2 QB 299.  Nb, the terminology of legitimate expectation was not used in this case. 
56 [1984] 1 WLR 1337 (CA). 
57 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Ruddock [1987] 1 WLR 1482. 
9 
 
legitimate expectation that telephone tapping would be authorised only in line with criteria set out in 
published guidance was not limited to the right to a hearing, since it would be inconsistent with the 
purpose of the telephone tap to require the Home Secretary to give notice that he was contemplating 
departing from the guidelines.  There was some judicial doubt about the compatibility of substantive 
protection for legitimate expectations with the no-fettering rule; indeed, Hirst LJ in Hargreaves 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ŝƚĂƐ  ‘ŚĞƌĞƐǇ ?.58  Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in Coughlan59 confirmed that, where 
administrators had by their own actions created substantive legitimate expectations, these would in 
some circumstances receive substantive protection.  While the need for administrative flexibility was 
recognised, it was held that it was for the court to decide whether the public interest in making a 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŽƵƚǁĞŝŐŚĞĚƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?ƐůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂŐĞŶĐǇǁŽƵůĚŚŽŶŽƵƌ
its undertakings in the circumstances of the particular case.  However, the court held that the level of 
protection provided would vary depending on the circumstances, ranging from full substantive 
protection in a situation like that in Coughlan itself (involving a clear promise to a small number of 
individuals, upon which they had clearly relied and breach of which would cause them significant 
detriment), though procedural protection, to protection merely on Wednesbury grounds, as a relevant 
consideration to be taken into account by the decision-maker.   
This created some doubt as to whether expectations arising merely from the existence of some policy 
or guidance, without a ĐůĞĂƌĞƌƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚĂƉƉůǇƚŽƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ?ƐĐĂƐĞ ?ĐŽƵůĚŽƌ
should be regarded as attracting substantive protection.60  It is apparent from the subsequent cases 
that they can do so, but two types of situation, which receive different levels of protection, need to 
be distinguished.   
The first is where an agency seeks to change a policy or rule, and the applicant is trying to insist that 
the original policy or rule be applied to her case.  In Niazi,61 the Court of Appeal held that legitimate 
expectations would not normally arise in such situations.  According to Laws LJ, although  ‘ ?Ž ?ŶĐĞƐĞƚ
in place, every policy of a public authority, not subject to a stated terminal date or terminating event, 
may no doubt be expected to continue until rational grounds for its cessation arise ? ?ƚŚŝƐĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
always give rise to a substantive legitimate expectation.62  On the contrary,  
a public authority will not often be held bound by the law to maintain in being a policy which 
on reasonable grounds it has chosen to alter or abandon.  Nor will the law often require such 
a body to involve a section of the public in its decision-making process by notice or 
consultation if there has been no promise or practice that effect.  There is an underlying 
reason for this.  Public authorities typically, and central government par excellence, enjoy wide 
discretions which it is their duty to exercise in the public interest.  They have to decide the 
content and the pace of change.  Often they must balance different, indeed opposing, 
interests across a wide spectrum.  Generally they must be the masters of procedure as well as 
substance; and as such are generally entitled to keep their own counsel.  All this is involved in 
                                                          
58 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Hargreaves [1997] 1 WLR 906 at 921.  See also In Re 
Findlay [1985] AC 318 HL(E); Hughes v Department of Health and Social Security [1985] AC 776. 
59 R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex p Coughlan [2001] QB 213. 
60 ^ĞĞ ?ĞŐ ?ZůĂǇƚŽŶ ? ‘>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?WŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>: ? ? ?ŚŵĞĚ
and Perry, above n51. 
61 R (Niazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 755. 
62 Ibid, paras 34  W 35. 
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what Sedley LJ described (BAPIO [2007] EWCA Civ 1139 paragraph 43) as the entitlement of 
central government to formulate policy.  This entitlement  W in truth a duty  W is ordinarily 
ƌĞƉƵŐŶĂŶƚƚŽĂŶǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƚŽďŽǁƚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛǁŝůů ?ĂůďĞŝƚŝŶƚŚĞŶĂŵĞŽĨĂƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞ
legitimate expectation.  It is repugnant also to an enforced obligation, in the name of a 
procedural legitimate expectation to take into account and respond to the views of particular 
persons whom the decision maker has chosen not to consult.63 
Nevertheless,  ‘ƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚǁŝůů ?ƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽƚŚĞŽǀĞƌƌŝĚŝŶŐƉƵďůŝĐŝŶƚĞƌ Ɛƚ ?ŝŶƐŝƐƚŽŶƐƵĐŚĂƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ ?
and enforce such an obligation, where the decision-ŵĂŬĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĂĐƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞďĞƐŽ
unfair as to amount to an abuse of power, by reason of the way in which it has earlier conducted 
ŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?ďĞĂƌŝŶŐŝŶŵŝŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐŽĨƵŶĨĂŝƌŶĞƐƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĐůŽƐĞĚ ?64  Thus, substantive legitimate 
expectations may be upheld to prevent rules or policies being changed, but only exceptionally and 
usually only where the applicant has specifically relied upon them.65  For instance, in R (Patel) v 
General Medical Council,66 the Court of Appeal quashed the application of new rules on recognition of 
overseas medical qualifications to the applicant.  He had undertaken training following a clear, 
unambiguous, and unqualified representation to him that his qualification would be recognised.  
Moreover, the rule change had been made with immediate effect, without considering its necessity 
or likely impact, and without making transitional provision for people in the applicant ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?  
By contrast, the courts are much more willing to hold administrators to their policies in the second 
situation, namely where, without seeking to change an existing policy, the decision-maker 
nevertheless departs from it in relation to a particular case.  In such cases, the applicant is normally 
entitled to insist that the policy be followed,67 subject to an overriding justification for not doing so, 
and this will apply irrespective of any reliance by the applicant upon the policy, or even whether she 
was aware of it.68  In fact, the Supreme Court has now held in Mandalia69 that such cases are not 
properly to be regarded as falling within the legitimate expectations doctrine at all.  Rather, affirming 
the dictum of Laws LJ in Nadarajah,70 the court said that they involve the application of a free-standing 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ŽĨ ŐŽŽĚ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ  ‘ďǇ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƉƵďůŝĐ ďŽĚŝĞƐ ŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽ ĚĞĂů ƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚůǇ ĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ? ? 
Thus, whereas the no-ĨĞƚƚĞƌŝŶŐƌƵůĞƐĞĞŬƐƚŽƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ ?ĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞtheir minds, 
substantive legitimate expectations and related doctrines sometimes prevent them from doing so.  
                                                          
63 Ibid, para 41. 
64 Ibid, para 42. 
65 Ibid, per Sedley >:ĂƚƉĂƌĂ ? ? ?ŶĚƐĞĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇZtŝůůŝĂŵƐ ? ‘dŚĞDƵůƚŝƉůĞŽĐƚƌŝŶĞƐŽĨ>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ
ǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>YZ ? ? ?Ăƚ ? ? ? W 9. 
66 [2013] 1 WLR 2801. 
67 ie, subject to the usual requirements that the policy is intra vires (see R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2012] 1 AC 245 per Lord Dyson at para 35) and that it is reasonable to rely on it.  Eg, citing 
R (Davies and Gaines-Cooper) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2011] 1 WLR 2625, Williams notes that 
rules will need to be sufficiently clear to establish whether the agency is indeed acting inconsistently with 
them (above n65, at 660).  In Davies and Gaines-Cooper ?ƚŚĞŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘ŚĞĂůƚŚǁĂƌŶŝŶŐ ?ŝŶĂƚĂǆŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞ
document was also a factor in holding that it did not create enforceable obligations.   
68 See: R (Rashid) v Home Secretary[2005] EWCA Civ 744; Oxfam v HMRC [2010] STC 686; Mandalia v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 59; R (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] 
1 WLR 1717. 
69 Above n68. 
70 R( Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 at para 68. 
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Can these apparently contradictory imperatives be reconciled, either in practice or in principle?  
Attempts to do so typically involve one of two approaches.  The first is to restrict the scope of the no-
fettering rule; the second is to reconceptualise it.  ŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌŝƐƌĂŝŐ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ
the operation of the legitimate expectations doctrine does not in fact unduly inhibit public authorities ? 
freedom to develop policy, particularly because many cases are concerned with the timing of the new 
policy rather than precluding policy change altogether.71  Similarly, Cane points out that legitimate 
expectations can be overridden if there are good reasons of public policy why they should not be 
upheld.72 
Although it may well be correct to say that legitimate expectations and related doctrines do not unduly 
inhibit administrative flexibility, it is important to recognise that they do constrain it in a way which 
seems to restrict the application of the no-fettering rule.  For one thing, the rule appears to be limited 
to a freedom to change policy, rather than freedom to decide how much weight should be given to 
policy in any particular case.  In the policy departure cases, the presumption underpinning the no-
fettering rule  W that discretion must be preserved  W seems to have been turned on its head: discretion 
must not be exercised unless it can be justified in the particular case.  Secondly, although in both policy 
change and policy departure cases, the obligation to follow policy may be overridden if there is good 
reason to do so, it is the court rather than the administrative agency which is the ultimate judge of 
that question.  In policy change cases, Hilson has argued that there is in reality no conflict between 
legitimate expectations and the no-fettering rule because the existence of a legitimate expectation 
effectively operates to require the decision-maker to make an exception to the new policy rather than 
rigidly implementing it.73  However, whereas the British Oxygen Co principle requires the decision-
maker to leave open the possibility of making an exception, the substantive legitimate expectations 
doctrine forces them to do so.  Again, therefore, rather than preserving administrative discretion, 
substantive legitimate expectations operate to control the merits of particular decisions. 
The second strategy for reconciling the no-fettering rule and judicial enforcement of policies  W the 
reconceptualization approach  W is most relevant to the policy departure cases.  It is commonly argued 
that the free-standing principle being protected in these cases is the principle of consistency,74 and  W 
far from being incompatible with the no-fettering rule  W Galligan has argued that the principle of 
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇ ŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽ ďĞ ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ ĂƐ ŝƚƐ  ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ƐŝĚĞ ? ?75  In other words, while the principle of 
consistency requires that like cases be treated alike, and therefore that policies should be followed, it 
also requires unlike cases to be treated differently, which is what the no-fettering rule aims to ensure 
by preventing over-rigid application of policies.   
There are, however, also problems with this approach.  First, since the requirement to treat unlike 
cases differently is part of the principle of consistency, it is not clear why it requires to be expressed 
in a separate doctrine.  Secondly, as Galligan acknowledges, the no-fettering rule has not historically 
been concerned with ensuring consistency:76 quite the opposite  W consistency has been expressly 
                                                          
71 Craig, above n28, at 674  W 675.  
72 Cane, above n53, at 156. 
73 C Hilson ? ‘WŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĞEŽŶ-Fetter Principle and the Principle of Substantive Legitimate Expectations: 
ĞƚǁĞĞŶĂZŽĐŬĂŶĚĂ,ĂƌĚWůĂĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Judicial Review 289. 
74 See, eg, Clayton, above n60; Craig, above n28, at 540; zŽƚĂŶ ? ‘tŚǇĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐshould be Bound by 
dŚĞŝƌWŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?17 OJLS 23, 28; Williams, above n65, at 659  W 662. 




regarded as less important than doing justice in the individual case.77  In order to achieve doctrinal 
consistency between the no-fettering rule and the policy-departure cases, therefore, it appears to be 
necessary to reconceptualize it  W again not as a rule concerned with preserving administrative 
flexibility, but rather as a principle of rational decision-making.78  Once more, this shifts the focus of 
judicial attention away from the decision-making process towards the substantive merits of the 
decision.   
Regulating Administrative Rule-Making 
The argument made so far is that the no-fettering rule has evolved from its original function as means 
of preserving administrative discretion into a technique for regulating the degree to which 
administrative agencies may or must act in accordance with rules.  However, this does not exhaust 
judicial intervention in administrative rule-making.  As the courts have become more willing to permit 
administrators to structure their discretion through rules, they have also become more willing to 
regulate rules and rule-making in other ways, both substantive and procedural.  The general trend is 
for greater judicial intervention, but the extent of regulation remains patchy and uncertain in some 
respects, and its conceptual basis is sometimes unclear.   
1. Substantive Controls 
Clearly, administrative agencies cannot unilaterally expand the scope of their legal authority.  
Accordingly, it is uncontroversial that where decisions are made in reliance on informal rules or 
policies, those rules or policies will be vulnerable to attack if they are in substance ultra vires or 
otherwise unlawful.  More problematic, however, is whether policies are reviewable directly, rather 
than in the context of their application to particular cases.  Direct rather than purely collateral attack 
extends both the opportunities for, and the reach of, judicial control, but judges may be wary of being 
drawn into deciding hypothetical points, especially in politically controversial areas. 
Royal College of Nursing v Department of Health and Social Security79 involved an attempt to challenge 
the legality of advice on the performance of abortions by medical induction contained in a letter sent 
by the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) to health officials.  Without addressing the 
jurisdictional point, the House of Lords was prepared to grant a declaration that the advice was legally 
correct.  Subsequently, in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA,80 their Lordships confirmed that 
the courts did have jurisdiction to correct errors of law in government documents  W in this case, a 
DHSS circular on the provision of contraceptive advice.  However, Lord Bridge of Harwich noted that 
the document under attack had no legal force, and that to accept jurisdiction to review it would 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ĞǆƚĞŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉŽǁĞƌ ? Accordingly, review should be exercised with restraint, 
particularly in areas with political, social or moral overtones, and should be limited to correcting 
clearly-defined errors of law.  Questions as to whether 'the advice tendered in such non-statutory 
                                                          
77 See eg R v Flintshire CC County Licensing (Stage Plays) Committee ex p Barrett [1957] 1 QB 350 per Singleton 
LJ at 359; Merchandise Transport Ltd v British Transport Commission (No 1) [1962] 2 QB 173, per Devlin LJ at 193.  
And de Smith notes (above n19, at para 9.014) that the no-fettering rule at one time precluded the use of 
precedent in tribunal decision-making. 
78 See, eg, Matadeen v Pointu [1997] 1 AC 98, per Lord Hoffmann at 109. 
79 [1981] AC 800. 
80 [1986] AC 112. 
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ŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞŝƐŐŽŽĚŽƌďĂĚ ?ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞŽƌƵŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ?ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚ ‘ĂƐĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůƌƵůĞ ?ďĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽĂŶǇ
ĨŽƌŵŽĨũƵĚŝĐŝĂůƌĞǀŝĞǁ ? ?81 
Subsequent practice is not entirely consistent.  While judicial review is regularly permitted,82 there are 
occasions on which courts have declined to review non-legally binding rules or policies, and in 
particular, they may be unwilling to make rulings where the legality of the advice contained in them 
is heavily fact dependent.83  In addition, it is unclear why in principle there should be a distinction 
between review for error of law and review on other grounds.  If policies may be struck down on 
irrationality grounds in the context of their application to particular cases,84 there is no obvious reason 
ǁŚǇƚŚŝƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞůĞƐƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚƌĞǀŝĞǁ ?ƐƌĂŝŐƐĂǇƐ ? ‘ĂŐĞŶĐǇĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ
ƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚ QďĞŝŵŵƵŶĞĨƌŽŵƐƵĐŚŽǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚŵĞƌĞůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĂƌƵůĞ ? ?85 
When it comes to the interpretation rather than the legality of administrative rules, courts appear to 
have no qualms about intervening.  It has been clear since the 1970s that courts will review the 
meaning given to non-statutory rules,86 but until recently there was some dispute about the standard 
to be applied.87  However, in R (Raissi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,88 the Court of 
Appeal held that the appropriate test was not whether the interpretation adopted by the minister was 
a reasonable one, but ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŽĂƐŬǁŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĂŶĚůŝƚĞƌĂƚĞŵĂŶ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚing of it would 
ďĞ ? ?  YƵŽƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ŽĨ >ŽƌĚ ^ƚĞǇŶ ŝŶIn Re McFarland,89 Hooper LJ held that 
interpretation of non-statutory guidance was a matter of law for the courts: 
In my view  Q in respect of the many kinds of  ‘soft laws ? with which we are now familiar, one must 
bear in mind that citizens are led to believe that the carefully drafted and considered statements 
truly represent government policy which will be observed in decision-making unless there is good 
reason to depart from it. It is an integral part of the working of a mature process of public 
administration. Such policy statements are an important source of individual rights and 
corresponding duties. In a fair and effective public law system such policy statements must be 
interpreted objectively in accordance with the language employed by the minister. The citizen is 
entitled to rely on the language of the statement, seen as always in its proper context. The very 
reason for making the statement is to give guidance to the public. The decision-maker, here a 
minister, may depart from the policy but until he has done so, the citizen is entitled to ask in a 
court of law whether he fairly comes within the language of the publicly announced policy. That 
question, like all questions of interpretation, is one of law. And on such a question of law it 
necessarily follows that the court does not defer to the minister: the court is bound to decide such 
a question for itself, paying, of course, close attention to the reasons advanced for the competing 
                                                          
81 Ibid, at 192  W 194; see also Lord Templeman at 206. 
82 See, eg, Wade and Forsyth, above n28, at 486; Elliott and Varuhas, above n12, at 524  W 528. 
83 Elliott and Varuhas, above n12, at 527.  See, eg, Bibi, above n45, in which the Supreme Court was split on 
whether it was appropriate to give a ruling declaring circumstances in which guidance would be incompatible 
with Convention rights. 
84 See eg R v NW Lancashire HA ex p A [2000] 1 WLR 977; R (Limbu) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2008] HRLR 48. 
85 Craig, above n28 at 469. 
86 See HTV v Price Commission [1976] ICR 170 CA (Civ Div). 
87 See Wade and Forsyth, above n28, at 277. 
88 [2008] QB 836. 
89 [2004] 1 WLR 1289 at para 24. 
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interpretations. This is not to say that policy statements must be construed like primary or 
subordinate legislation. It seems sensible that a broader and wholly untechnical approach should 
prevail. But what is involved is still an interpretative process conducted by a court which must 
necessarily be approached objectively and without speculation about what a particular minister 
may have had in mind. 
This approach  W endorsed by the Supreme Court in Mandalia  W significantly undermines the distinction 
between binding legal rules and non-binding policy or guidance.  However, as far as the application of 
policy to the facts of particular cases is concerned, the Court of Appeal has held that the appropriate 
test remains one of rationality.90  It was argued before the Supreme Court in R (O) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department91 that such cases should equally be decided according to a correctness 
standard, but the court considered it unnecessary to decide this point. 
Finally, there is continuing uncertainty about whether the courts may review administrative rules or 
policies for lack of precision.  There have been suggestions that policies which are unclear or 
ambiguous may be struck down for irrationality.92  However, in R (Gurung) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department,93 the Court of Appeal refused to hold a policy concerning the right of resettlement 
in the UK for the adult dependents of former Gurkhas to be unlawful on grounds of uncertainty merely 
because different decision-makers applying the policy might treat the same facts differently. 
2. Procedural Controls 
Perhaps surprisingly, procedural control of administrative rule-making is currently less extensive than 
substantive control.  Nevertheless, the law does seem to be moving towards the general position that 
policies and so on may not be relied upon unless they have been published.  But the legal basis for a 
duty to publish, and whether it involves publication to the world at large or only to those directly 
affected, is unclear. 
Various legal foundations for a duty to publish have been suggested.  One argument is that such a 
duty is inherent in the no-fettering rule itself, given that, without knowing the usual policy, it is 
impossible to make the case for an exception.94  A similar obligation to disclose a policy to affected 
persons might also be derived from the right to notice under the rules of natural justice.95  However, 
in R (Reilly) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,96 the Supreme Court refused to hold that the 
Home Secretary was obliged to publish information about the Workfare scheme generally, since what 
mattered was whether the claimant had in fact been given all the information she required about the 
scheme, not the form that the notice took.  PublicatioŶŝŶǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŽƌǀŝĂƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐǁĞďƐŝƚĞǁĂƐ
nevertheless recognised to be desirable, both in principle and because otherwise it would be harder 
evidentially for the Department to prove that the notice requirement had been met.  There may also 
                                                          
90 R (ZS) (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 1137. 
91 [2016] UKSC 19 
92 See, eg, Limbu, above n84, [2008] HRLR 48 at paras 69  W 70.  
93 [2013] 1 WLR 2546 (CA). 
94 See Baldwin and Houghton, above n2, at 277; Craig, above n28, at 539  W 540; de Smith, above n19, at para 
9.004; and see eg Brockman, above n22, at 788. 
95 de Smith, above n19, at para 9.010. 
96 [2014] AC 453. 
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be a duty to publish in Convention rights cases, deriving from the requirement that interferences with 
rights must be authorised by law which is clear and accessible.97 
The broadest statements of a duty to publish are found in Salih98 and Lumba,99 both of which involved 
deliberate concealment of government policies.  Salih concerned a scheme to provide  ‘ŚĂƌĚĐĂƐĞƐ ?
support for failed asylum seekers.  The Home Secretary had decided not to inform failed asylum 
seekers of the availability of support in order to deter applications, the scheme being intended for 
exceptional cases only.  Stanley Burton J considered that this decision was irrational, because not 
informing those who might be eligible for support of its existence was inconsistent with the purpose 
of the scheme.  ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŚĞ ĂůƐŽ ŵĂĚĞ ƚŚĞ ďƌŽĂĚĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ ?ů ?ĞĂǀŝŶŐ ĂƐŝĚĞ
contexts such as national security, it is in general inconsistent with the constitutional imperative that 
statute law to be made known for the government to withhold information about its policy relating 
ƚŽƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŽĨƉŽǁĞƌĐŽŶĨĞƌƌĞĚďǇƐƚĂƚƵƚĞ ? ?100 
In Lumba, the Home Secretary had applied an unpublished policy of blanket detention of all foreign 
national prisoners on completion on their sentences, which was inconsistent both with her published 
policy and with the underlying legal power to detain.  Again, a deliberate decision had been taken to 
continue with the unpublished policy despite concerns about its legality, and caseworkers had been 
instructed to conceal its existence by giving reasons which conformed with the published policy.  As 
well as condemning the policy in substance as ultra vires and an unlawful fetter on discretion, the 
Supreme Court by a majority held that applying an unpublished policy was an unlawful exercise of the 
,ŽŵĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?Ɛdetention power.  According to Lord Dyson: 
The rule of law calls for a transparent statement by the executive of the circumstances in 
which the broad statutory criteria will be exercised.  QThe individual has a basic public law 
right to have his or her case considered under whatever policy the executive sees fit to adopt 
provided that the adopted policy is a lawful exercise of the discretion conferred by the statute 
 Q. There is a correlative right to know what that currently existing policy is, so that the 
individual can make relevant representations in relation to it.101 
ƐůůŝŽƚƚĂŶĚsĂƌƵŚĂƐŶŽƚĞ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĚƵƚǇƚŽƉƵďůŝƐŚ ‘ŚĂƐƐŽĨĂƌďĞĞŶůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚo cases concerning 
basic aspects of well-being, the rationales given for it suggest it is likely to be of more general 
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?102 
By contrast, the courts remain very unwilling to impose consultation obligations in relation to rule-
making.  The general position remains as stated in Bates v Lord Hailsham103 that the rules of natural 
justice do not apply to decisions of a legislative character; a position confirmed by the Court of Appeal 
in R (BAPIO) v Secretary of State for the Home Department104 essentially on grounds of practicality.  
Thus, consultation obligations may arise only exceptionally as the result of a procedural or substantive 
                                                          
97 See further below at text accompanying nn 111  W 121. 
98 R (Salih) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 2273 (Admin). 
99 Above n67. 
100 Salih, above n98, at para 52. 
101 Lumba, above n67, at paras 34  W 35. 
102 Above n12, at 183. 
103 [1972] 1 WLR 1373. 
104 [2007] EWCA Civ 1139 per Sedley LJ at paras 33  W 47.  
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legitimate expectation.  Moreover, in Niazi, the Court of Appeal rejected an argument that the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽĚĞŽĨWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽŶŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶĐŽƵůĚŐŝǀĞƌŝƐĞƚŽƐƵĐŚĂŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚŽůĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ
the Code applied wherever the government decided as a matter of public policy to have a 
consultation; not that a public consultation was required before every policy change.105  Nevertheless, 
where an administrative agency does choose to consult, it must do so properly and fairly.106 
Mandating Administrative Rules 
The story told so far has been one of increased judicial acceptance of the legitimacy of administrative 
rule-making, which is now regarded as a normal part of the administrative process and therefore 
properly the subject of legal control.  Indeed, recent cases are full of statements as to the benefits of 
administrative rule making,107 and there is also a notable unwillingness to extend the scope of the no-
fettering rule.  Thus, it has been held to be inapplicable to statutory rule-making powers,108 and to the 
exercise of common law and prerogative powers.109  This sets the scene for a further nascent 
development in judicial control of administrative rule-making, namely an obligation in some 
circumstances actually to adopt rules or policies. 
In fact, such an obligation might be thought to be implicit in the way the no-fettering rule has 
developed since British Oxygen Co.  Although Lord Reid ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?ƐĨƌĞĞĚŽŵƚŽ
choose whether or not to have rules, once one sees the no-fettering rule as concerned, not with the 
retention of discretion, but rather with the appropriate degree of structuring of discretion, there is no 
logical reason why judges should be concerned only with excessive and not with inadequate 
structuring.  Indeed, it has been suggested obiter in a no-fettering case that it might sometimes be 
irrational not to have a policy.110   
However, the major catalyst for change has been the Human Rights Act.  In 2009, in Purdy,111 the 
House of Lords ordered the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to formulate and publish guidelines 
as to the factors to be taken into account in determining whether it would be in the public interest to 
prosecute someone for assisting another person to commit suicide contrary to section 2(1) of the 
Suicide Act 1961.  Mrs Purdy, who suffered from a terminal illness, had complained that her Article 8 
right had been infringed because she was uncertain whether her husband would face prosecution if 
he assisted her in travelling abroad to commit suicide.  The ECtHR in Pretty v United Kingdom112 had 
accepted that a ban on assisted suicide was not a disproportionate interference with Article 8.  
EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ĂŶǇƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶŚĂĚƚŽďĞ ‘ŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĂǁ ? ? ‘ůĂǁ ?ďĞŝŶŐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĞĚďƌŽĂĚůǇďǇ
the Strasbourg court to include both formal law and informal guidance.113  Moreover, to satisfy the 
Convention requirement of legality, the rules in question had to be sufficiently accessible to affected 
individuals and sufficiently precise to enable them to be able to foresee the consequences of their 
                                                          
105 Above n61, at paras 53  W 54. 
106 See, eg, R (Easyjet Airline Co Ltd) v Civil Aviation Authority [2009] EWCA Civ 1361. 
107 See, eg, Nicholds, above n32, at paras 56  W 57; Tigere, above n47, per Lord Hughes, and per Lords Sumption 
and Reed. 
108 Nicholds, above n32. 
109 R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] EWCA Civ 1293; [2006] 1 WLR 3213; R (Sandiford) v 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2014] UKSC 44; [2014] 1 WLR 2697. 
110 Ex p A, above n84, per Auld LJ at 991. 
111 R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] 1 AC 345. 
112 (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
113 Kafkaris v Cyprus (2008) 25 BHRC 591 at para 139. 
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actions, and not applied in an arbitrary manner.114  The House of Lords considered that these 
requirements were not satisfied in Purdy because there was a gap between the letter of the 1961 Act 
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞWW ?ƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨ ƌĂƌĞůǇƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŶŐĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚƐƵŝĐŝĚĞ cases, the principles governing which 
were unclear.   
Purdy is in fact a good example of the double-edged implications of Convention rights for the 
structuring of administrative discretion.  While the existence of discretion in deciding when to 
prosecute cases of assisted suicide had been a key element in persuading the ECtHR in Pretty that 
s2(1) of the 1961 Act did not in practice amount to a blanket ban and therefore was not 
disproportionate ?ƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŽĨĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞ ‘ŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚůĂǁ ?ƵŶůĞƐƐƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ
greater clarity about the factors which the DPP would take into account.115 
Purdy is a controversial case,116 and there has clearly been unwillingness to push the ruling further in 
the assisted suicide context.  In Nicklinson,117 the Supreme Court refused to order the DPP to further 
clarify his guidelines to deal with the position of paid carers (rather than family members) assisting 
suicide.  Although some judges hinted that the DPP should amend his guidelines,118 powerful dissents 
by Lord Hughes and Lord Kerr, who criticised Purdy as having blurred the line between prosecutorial 
guidance and amendment of the law, persuaded the court that they should not seek to dictate to the 
DPP the content of his policy.  An attempt to force the Lord Advocate to issue similar guidance on the 
prosecution of assisted suicide in Scotland also failed.119  While the Inner House distinguished both 
the scope of the offence and prosecutorial practice in Scotland from the situation in England, Lord 
Drummond-Young also argued that it was wrong in principle to seek to confine prosecutorial 
discretion too closely, and endorsed the view of the minority in Nicklinson that to require the 
prosecutor in effect to give guarantees of immunity from prosecution to certain categories of people 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ĂŶĂĨĨƌŽŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƌƵůĞ ? ?120 
Nevertheless, the reasoning in Purdy is potentially applicable in other contexts.  For instance, in The 
Christian Institute v Lord Advocate,121 albeit in the context of statutory guidance, the Supreme Court 
held that, in order ĨŽƌƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐEĂŵĞĚWĞƌƐŽŶƐ scheme to satisfy the requirement 
ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ďĞ  ‘ŝŶ ĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ůĂǁ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ŽĨ ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ? ?,) clearer guidance was required 
regarding when it would be proportionate to share information about young persons under the 
scheme.  
Also potentially very significant beyond the Convention rights context is Nzolameso v Westminster 
CC,122 in which the Supreme Court appeared to found a duty to adopt a policy upon the duty to give 
reasons.  Quashing a decision to rehouse a homeless woman with five children outside the local 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ƐĂƌĞĂ ?ƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽƵŶĐŝůƚŽŚĂǀĞpolicies for the procurement 
                                                          
114 Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom 2013) 57 EHRR SE 17. 
115 Above n111, per Lady Hale at para 63. 
116 ^ĞĞ ?ĞŐ ?ZEŽďůĞƐĂŶĚ^ĐŚŝĨĨ ? ‘ŝƐŽďĞĚŝĞŶĐĞƚŽ>Ăǁ W Debbie WƵƌĚǇ ?ƐĂƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D>Z ? ? ? ?:
DŽŶƚŐŽŵĞƌǇ ? ‘'ƵĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ'ĂƚĞƐŽĨ^ƚWĞƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>ĞŐ^ƚƵĚƐ ? ? ? ? 
117 R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38; [2016] AC 657. 
118 See ibid, per Lord Neuberger at para 146 and Lady Hale at para 323. 
119 Ross v Lord Advocate [2016] CSIH 12; 2016 SC 502. 
120 Ibid at para 86. 
121 [2016] UKSC 51. 
122 [2015] UKSC 22. 
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and allocation of temporary accommodation in order to be able adequately to explain its decisions as 
to the location of properties offered.  Although it stopped short of ruling that this was the only way in 
which the duty to give reasons could be satisfied, the court nevertheless went to some lengths to 
outline what it considered to be desirable. 
It is not yet clear how far a duty to structure discretion in this manner will extend.  Nevertheless, in 
being prepared to mandate the adoption of administrative rules or policies, judicial attitudes to 
administrative rule-making appear to have turned full circle.  Admittedly, mandating the adoption of 
policies is arguably not technically inconsistent with the no-fettering rule insofar as any policy must 
still be applied flexibly.  Nevertheless, this again reduces the no-fettering principle to a residual rule 
about rational decision-making, and makes the court, not the administrator, the master both of the 
degree of structuring that is appropriate and the application of policy in any particular case.  Thus the 
orientation of judicial control has moved a very long way from the initial concern to ensure that 
discretion is retained. 
Rethinking Judicial Control of Administrative Rule-Making 
IŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ĂůĚǁŝŶ ĂŶĚ ,ŽƵŐŚƚŽŶ ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ǁĂǇ ŽĨ ĚĞĂůŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ ƌƵůĞƐ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƚŽ ƐǁĞĞƉ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƌƉĞƚ ? ?123  This is no longer a fair 
characterisation.  Since the early 1970s, judicial attitudes to the control of administrative rule-making 
have been transformed  W from a position which, without prohibiting administrative rule-making, 
certainly deprived it of any significant legal status or effect, through an essentially permissive approach 
ushered in by British Oxygen Co, to increasing judicial regulation of administrative rules since the 
1980s, to the situation today in which the adoption of rules or policies may sometimes be mandatory. 
Nevertheless, the current law is still far from satisfactory.  One problem is the evolutionary nature of 
the change that has occurred.  As so often in the development of the common law, new attitudes and 
doctrines have emerged without making a decisive break with the past.  The old way of thinking, as 
encapsulated in the no-fettering rule, has not been completely dislodged, and continues to frame and 
shape judicial intervention.  Yet it exists in considerable tension with new doctrines, and its scope and 
functions appear to have changed significantly.  Secondly, the growth of new judicial controls has 
largely been indirect; parasitic upon other legal doctrines, which may struggle fully to accommodate 
administrative rule-making, and which may require the identification of something exceptional to 
justify judicial intervention.  But there is, of course, nothing exceptional about administrative rule-
making; it is a routine aspect of the administrative process which should not be beyond the reach of 
judicial control.  Recent developments suggest that judges are beginning to recognise this and to 
attach free-standing obligations to the use of administrative rules.  However, the conceptual basis for 
ƚŚĞƐĞ ŶĞǁ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ĐůĞĂƌ ?  tŚĂƚ  ‘ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨ ŐŽŽĚ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? requires that 
administrators follow their own rules, and why should departing from rules be treated so differently 
from changing rules?  Why should the standard for judicial interpretation of rules be one of 
correctness rather than reasonableness, and why does this not also apply to the application of rules?  
Why should administrators be under an obligation to publish their rules, but not to consult over their 
development? 
                                                          
123 Above n2, at 269. 
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The time therefore seems ripe for re-evaluation and reconceptualization of judicial control of 
administrative rule-making.  In the remainder of this article I sketch the outlines of an alternative, I 
believe more coherent approach.  This starts by distinguishing two logically separate issues which, 
because of the influence of the no-fettering rule, are not always clearly differentiated.  The first is 
whether administrators should have rules  W ie, how far should they be permitted or required to 
confine and structure their discretion?  The second concerns the regulation of rules  W ie, what are the 
conditions of legitimate rule-making?  On the former issue, I suggest that the courts should play only 
a residual role: the law should abandon any lingering presumption in favour of retention of discretion, 
but should not replace it with a duty to make rules.  On the latter issue, however, I argue for a more 
rigorous approach to the regulation of administrative rules where a decision has been taken to employ 
them. 
Structuring Discretion 
1. Retention of Discretion? 
The starting point for a more rational approach to judicial control of administrative rule-making is to 
abandon the no-fettering rule.  This is not to suggest that the rule as it currently operates performs 
no useful functions: it enables courts to insist, where appropriate, that rules or policies are not applied 
in an unduly rigid fashion; and it preserves ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ ? flexibility to change their rules or policies 
as necessary.  However, these functions can be performed more satisfactorily through a combination 
of rationality review and direct regulation of the conditions of legitimate rule-making, without needing 
to be expressed as a general presumption in favour of retaining discretion.  There is, I argue, no 
doctrinal or principled basis on which to justify such a presumption. 
The doctrinal basis of the no-fettering rule is in fact somewhat obscure.  The most common 
assumption is that it is based on the intention of Parliament: where Parliament has conferred a 
discretion, rather than an explicit power to make rules, it must have intended that discretion be 
exercised.124  This assumption appears to underpin recent decisions that the no-fettering rule has no 
application to rules adopted under explicit statutory authority,125 or in exercise of common law or 
prerogative powers.126  In Sandiford,127 two alternative statutory intent-based justifications were 
offered.  For Lords Carnwath and Mance: 
The basis of the statutory principle is that the legislature in conferring the power, rather than 
imposing an obligation to exercise it in one sense, must have contemplated that it might be 
appropriate to exercise it in different senses in different circumstances. But prerogative 
powers do not stem from any legislative source  Q and there is no external originator who 
could have imposed any obligation to exercise them in one sense, rather than another. They 
are intrinsic to the Crown and it is for the Crown to determine whether and how to exercise 
them in its discretion.128 
                                                          
124 See authorities cited by Costello, above n16, at 356.  
125 Nicholds, above n32. 
126 Elias; Sandiford, above n109.  For earlier contrary authority, see Costello, above n16, at 356. 
127 Above n109 
128 Above n109, at para 61. 
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For Lord Sumption, on the other hand: 
The basis of the rule against the fettering of discretions  Q is that a discretion conferred on a 
decision-maker is to be exercised. Within the limits of that discretion  Q members of the class 
of potential beneficiaries have a right to be considered, even if they have no right to any 
particular outcome. The effect of the decision-maker adopting a self-imposed rule that he will 
exercise his discretion in only some of the ways permitted by the terms in which it was 
conferred, is to deny that right to those who are thereby excluded.129 
Neither explanation is convincing.  In relation to the former, as Galligan has pointed out, Parliament 
may have conferred a discretion, not so as to ensure that it be exercised differently in different 
circumstances, but rather simply to allow the administrator to decide how to act,130 which may 
encompass the form of decision-making  W through individualised decision-making or through rules  W 
as well as the content.  Indeed, in many parts of the administrative state, particularly those involving 
complex regulatory decisions by expert decision-makers, it makes more sense to understand 
discretion essentially as delegated power rather than as individuated power.  Nor, given the haphazard 
nature of the British administrative state, should too much be read into the presence or absence of 
express rule-making powers in particular contexts.131   
ƐĨĂƌĂƐ>ŽƌĚ^ƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ?ƚŚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽŝŶǀŽůǀĞĂĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇĞƌƌŽƌ ?tŚĞƌĞĂƐ
a right to be considered may be derived from a discretionary duty, it cannot logically be derived from 
a discretionary power without assuming that which it is trying to prove  W ie, that there is a duty to 
exercise a discretionary power which cannot therefore be fettered.132  And even in the case of 
discretionary duties, these are not always capable of giving rise to individually enforceable rights.  It 
would, for instance, be odd to justify the exercise of prosecutorial discretion on the basis of a 
ƐƵƐƉĞĐƚĞĚŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŚĂǀĞŚĞƌĐĂƐĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŽŶŝƚƐŵĞƌŝƚƐ ? 
An alternative justification for the no-fettering rule is that it is a means of ensuring the avoidance of 
errors.133  Lord Sumption appears to allude to this rationale in Sandiford, where he states that the 
adoption of a self-ŝŵƉŽƐĞĚƌƵůĞ ‘also leads to the arbitrary exclusion of information relevant to the 
discretion conferred, and thereby to inconsistent, capricious and potentially irrational decisions. ?134  
However, Perry convincingly rejects the error-avoidance justification on the basis, first, that 
administrative flexibility does not necessarily reduce the possibility of errors; indeed, it may increase 
it, for instance where complex decisions are made by decision-makers who are inexperienced, under-
resourced, negligent or prone to prejudice.  Secondly, he argues that other values associated with rigid 
policies, such as efficiency and predictability, may be more important than error avoidance in certain 
contexts.135 
                                                          
129 Above n109, at para 81. 
130 Above n13 (1976,) at 332.  See also Perry, above n19, at 386. 
131 Cf Galligan (1976), above n13, at 344. 
132 Cf Galligan (1976), above n13, at 353. 
133 See Perry, above n19, at 387  W 388.  
134 Sandiford, above n109, at para 81. 
135 See Perry, above n19 at 388  W 391. 
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Perry himself offers a third rationale for the no-fettering rule based on the value of participation, tying 
the justification for the rule to the right to a fair hearing.136  He argues that a hearing should be a real 
opportunity to participate in the decision at issue, and that this occurs only if the relevant policies to 
be applied are flexible.137  Again, though, this argument is problematic.  To begin with, as Perry 
acknowledges, the no-fettering rule has not usually been understood since British Oxygen Co as being 
connected to the right to a hearing,138 and as argued above, Lord Reid in that case appeared to reject 
the view implicit in Kynoch that a hearing was always required to avoid unlawful fettering.  Secondly, 
as Perry also recognises, hearings are not universally required, so to tie the no-fettering rule to the 
right to a hearing would be to restrict its scope substantially.139  Third, and most fundamentally, the 
premise that meaningful participation requires an opportunity to contest the applicable rules is simply 
incorrect as a matter of law.  In any hearing involving statutory rather than administrative rules, the 
only issue concerns the application of the relevant rules to the facts, not the decision-making 
standards to be applied.  Accordingly, if there is a difference between hearings involving 
administrative rules and those involving statutory rules, this must be founded on some basis other 
than the right to a hearing itself.  In other words, the scope or content of the hearing that the law 
requires depends ŽŶŽŶĞ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐŽƌĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐƚŽƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making process (rigid 
or flexible), rather than vice versa.  
Instead, the rule appears to embody presumptions about the nature of the administrative process and 
the proper allocation of functions.  Ɛ'ĂůůŝŐĂŶƉƵƚŝƚ ? ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶŝĚĞĂďƵƌŝĞĚĚĞĞƉŝŶƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚƐŽĨ
ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐĂŶĚ ũƵĚŐĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƚŽĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶďǇƌƵůĞĂŶĚ
ƌŽƚĞŝƐƐŽŵĞŚŽǁƚŽĚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŝƚ ? ? ?140 But there is no consensus about why that should be.  As suggested 
above, one view is that the no-fettering rule embodies a distinction between legislation and 
administration, the making of rules being a function for Parliament, permissible by administrators only 
upon an express delegation.141  For Wade and Forsyth, however, the distinction is between 
adjudication, which involves deciding cases according to legal rules and precedents, so that like cases 
are treated alike, and administration, which requires cases to be treated on their merits.142  By 
contrast, Harlow and Rawlings argue that the no-fettering rule imposes on the administration an 
adjudicative model of individualised decision-making,143 whereas for de Smith, it is just an attempt to 
balance the competing values of certainty and consistency, on the one hand, against the value of 
responsiveness, on the other.144 
This confusion as to the ƌƵůĞ ?Ɛdoctrinal basis perhaps reflects the fact that, as a matter of principle, 
there is simply no justification for any presumption in favour of administrative discretion.  Rule-making 
is a perfectly normal feature of the administrative process  W indeed the stereotypical view of 
bureaucracy is one which is heavily dependent upon rules145  W and the desirable balance between 
                                                          
136 Ibid, at 391  W 397.   
137 Ibid, at 393. 
138 Ibid, at 393. 
139 Ibid, at 394, 397. 
140 Above n13 (1976), at 332 (reference omitted). 
141 See nn 17 - 18, above and accompanying text.   
142 Above n28, at 272. 
143 Above n4, at 217. 
144 Above n19, at para 9.005. 
145 See Christopher Hood, Administrative Analysis: An Introduction to Rules, Enforcement and Organisations 
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rules and discretion will vary from context to context.146  As Hilson has pointed out, the reformulation 
of the no-fettering rule in British Oxygen Co  W a permissive approach to rule-making tempered by a 
duty to consider exceptional cases  W represents an unsatisfactory compromise between the benefits 
of rules and discretion, which may in some circumstances prevent full realisation of the benefits of 
rules, while in others permitting excessive structuring.147  In practice, as I have suggested, the 
application of the no-fettering rule is highly context dependent.  But approaching the issue of the 
appropriate degree of structuring through the lens of a rule against fettering may result in a more 
intrusive judicial approach than might be warranted if the contextually-sensitive nature of the 
judgment were explicitly acknowledged. 
2. A Presumption in Favour of Rules? 
If the no-fettering rule is to be abandoned, ought it to be replaced by a fettering rule  W ie, a 
presumption (rebuttable where appropriate) that administrative agencies should seek to structure 
their discretionary powers through rules?   
Certainly it would be difficult to argue that courts should never mandate the adoption of 
administrative rules.  While Purdy and the other assisted suicide cases do raise legitimate concerns 
about breach of the separation of powers, they are somewhat unusual in involving a potential conflict 
between the content of administrative guidance and the strict letter of the law.  In the standard case, 
the function of administrative rules or policies is to supplement the underpinning legal provisions; 
indeed they would be ultra vires if they were to contradict the letter of the law.  But even in Purdy the 
separation of powers objection seems to be overblown.  For one thing, if it was legitimate for the DPP 
to adopt offence-specific guidelines voluntarily (as he had done for some other offences), it is difficult 
to see why it is objectionable for a court to mandate such guidelines.  Secondly, ƚŚĞWW ?ƐĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚ
suicide guidelines are just that: they set out factors tending towards and against prosecution, rather 
than creating de facto exceptions to the assisted suicide offence.148   
The real objection again is to the appropriateness of any general presumption in favour of rule-making.  
Rules have significant advantages in terms of promoting certainty, consistency, efficiency, and 
accountability.  But they can also have disadvantages in terms of rigidity, complexity, and lack of 
responsiveness.149  Again the optimum balance between rules and discretion will vary depending on 
the administrative context.  Moreover, the relationship between rules and discretion is a complex one.  
It is not straightforwardly the case that more of one means less of the other; in practice, therefore, 
rules may not be the best way of controlling discretionary powers.150  Neither the value of rules nor 
their effectiveness are judgments which courts are necessarily best placed to make.  For example, in 
Purdy it is not self-evident that the desire for certainty was more important than preservation of 
flexibility, or indeed that the published guidelines have done much to promote it.  Nor is it obvious 
                                                          
146 See, eg, Baldwin, above n13, ch 3, Galligan (1990), above n13 ?ĐŚ ? ?Ăƌů^ĐŚŶĞŝĚĞƌ ? ‘ŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶĂŶĚZƵůĞƐ P
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147 Hilson, above n13, at 113  W 114. 
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that the measures the DPP had already taken to promote consistency and prevent arbitrary decision-
making (concentrating decision-making in a Special Crimes Division and giving reasons for decisions 
not to prosecute) were insufficient.   
As Lord Neuberger acknowledged in Purdy, those best placed to judge whether, and to what degree, 
discretion should be structured through rules are administrators themselves.  As he also stated, this 
does not mean that the courts should play no role.151  But it does suggest that the judicial role ought 
to be a residual one, essentially applying an irrationality test, and subject to an appropriate degree of 
deference to the primary decision-maker.152  A stronger degree of control may be necessary in 
Convention rights cases, in order to comply with the Convention principle of legality, but even here 
there is obvious room for disagreement over the degree of clarity and accessibility that can 
appropriately be expected in particular contexts. 
The Conditions of Legitimate Administrative Rule-Making 
While an essentially permissive approach may be appropriate in relation to the decision whether to 
adopt administrative rules, judicial restraint seems much less justified in relation to the regulation of 
administrative rules, if an agency has chosen to adopt them.  As the cases discussed above 
demonstrate, the unregulated use of rules contains considerable potential for unfairness and abuse 
of power.  The challenge, though, is to find a coherent basis for judicial intervention which relies not 
merely upon being able to bring rule-making practices within existing judicial review doctrines nor 
upon a vague invocation of notions of fairness or good administration. 
Although space precludes the development of a fully worked-out model of legitimate administrative 
rule-making, I argue that the seeds of a rational approach can be found in the reasons for acting 
through rules.  A functional approach provides an immanent standard by which judges can hold 
administrators to the values which they can themselves be taken to profess.  It is also an approach 
which seeks not simply to control administrative action, but rather to enhance its legitimacy and 
thereby its effectiveness.   
What, then, are the functions of rules?  These can be categorised in various ways, 153 but for present 
purposes it is helpful to distinguish between two broad sets of functions.  &ŝƌƐƚĂƌĞƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂůŽƌ ‘ZƵůĞ
ŽĨ>Ăǁ ?ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƌƵůĞƐ; benefits which flow from decision-makers acting through the form of rules.  
These include: ensuring consistency and equality of treatment; preventing arbitrariness and reducing 
the likelihood of mistakes by controlling the reasons for which decisions are made; promoting 
transparency and official accountability; and so on.  The formal functions of rules emphasise their role 
in constraining and guiding behaviour, both of the decision-makers who employ them and of those 
who are subject to them.  Secondly, however, rules also bring substantive benefits in promoting better 
decision-making.  Rule-makers typically have more time to consider problems, and have access to a 
broader range of experience, information and opinion than is possible through individuated decision-
making.  As Baldwin puts it,  ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨ ƵƐŝŶŐ ƌƵůĞƐ ŝƐ  Q to place each decision in the broader 
                                                          
151 Above n111, at paras 99  W 100.  See also Sandiford, above n109, per Lords Carnwath and Mance at para 65. 
152 Cf Perry, above n19, at 390  W 391.  
153 See, eg Baldwin, above n13, at 12  W 14; Schneider, above n146, at 68  W 79; ::ŽǁĞůů ? ‘dŚĞ>ĞŐĂůŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨ
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context, allowing the longer view to be taken and incorporating more resources and evidence into the 
process of decision-ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ? ?154 
Extrapolating from these formal and substantive functions of rule-making may help us both to account 
for the ways in which rules are currently regulated, and to fill in the gaps in the current law. 
1. Rules and the Rule of Law 
The best-ŬŶŽǁŶĨŽƌŵĂůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞZƵůĞŽĨ>ĂǁŝƐ>ŽŶ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨ
law.155  Fuller regarded ůĂǁĂƐĂƉƵƌƉŽƐŝǀĞ ‘ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶĐŽŶĚƵĐƚƚŽƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ
ŽĨƌƵůĞƐ ?156 and governing through rules as involving a kind of reciprocity between government and 
the governed: in expecting citizens to follow rules, the government also undertakes to comply with 
them.  If this bond of reciprocity is breached, he argued, there is nothing left upon which to found the 
ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?ƐĚƵƚǇƚŽŽďƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĞ ƌƵůĞƐ ? ,Ğ ƚŚƵƐ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĞŝŐŚƚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ? ƚŚĞŽďƐĞƌǀĂŶĐĞŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ  W
though always a matter of degree  W was necessary for law to function as law.  In addition to a 
requirement of generality  W ie, the need for there to be rules of some sort  W &ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨ
legality included requirements of: 





x Constancy; and 
x Congruence between official action and the law. 
The description of these criteria as moral principles is controversial.157  Fuller regarded the existence 
of a legal system as a moral good, and therefore the principles of legality  W as constitutive of an 
effective legal system  W as themselves moral precepts.  Whether or not this is correct, it seems 
inapplicable in the context of administrative rule-making given that, as I have argued, the existence of 
rules cannot be regarded as a categorical good.  Nevertheless, if  W ĂƐŵĂŶǇŽĨ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐƐĂƌŐƵĞ  W 
the principles of legality are seen as principles of efficacy, they are equally (the requirement of 
generality apart) applicable to administrative rule-making.158  Indeed, that these principles are 
necessary conditions of effective rule-making is not controversial159 (even if it may be argued that they 
are incomplete).160  Viewed as functional principles, they are capable of generating regulatory 
standards for the control of administrative rule-making, just as the purpose of a statute generates 
standards for the control of decisions made under it.  However, as aspirational rather than absolute 
                                                          
154 Above n13, at 13; see also Schneider, above n146, at 72  W 73.  
155 The Morality of Law (revised edn, Yale University Press, 1969) ch 2. 
156 Ibid, at 96. 
157 &ŽƌĂŶŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?ƐĞĞWĞƚĞƌWEŝĐŚŽůƐŽŶ ? ‘dŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂůDŽƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨ>Ăǁ P&ƵůůĞƌĂŶĚ,ŝƐƌŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ethics 
307.  
158 In fact, Fuller himself seemed to accept that they could be applied to systems of internal rule-making, eg, in 
trade unions or universities  W above n155, at 129. 
159 See Nicholson, above n157, at 312. 
160 ^ĞĞZŽďĞƌƚ^^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ? ‘WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ&ƵůůĞƌŽŶDŽƌĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Journal of Legal Education 1, 19  W 
21.  And see further text accompanying nn166-168 below. 
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obligations, the principles of legality may sometimes have to yield to considerations of practicality or 
overriding considerations of fairness or public interest.  
Thus, the application of these principles to administrative rule-making can help us to make sense of 
the emerging case law discussed above, and guide its future development.  For example, the obligation 
not to depart from established rules without good reason may be understood as being based, not on 
the principle of consistency, but rather on the requirement of congruence between official action and 
law.  /ƚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ?ŝŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ŶŽƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞŵĞƌŝƚƐŽĨĂŶŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌ
with its formal legitimacy.  As such, it should carry no corresponding obligation to consider making an 
exception to the rule, thereby avoiding contradictory imperatives to apply rules yet not to fetter 
discretion.161  As argued above, the requirement to treat unlike cases differently is better seen as an 
aspect of the substantive rationality of a rule, in which case it requires an exception actually to be 
made and not merely considered. 
The principle of congruence between official action and the rules (and in particular the principle of 
reciprocity which underpins it) also justifies strong judicial control of the interpretation of rules, but 
would suggest that rule-application ought equally to be subject to a correctness rather than merely a 
reasonableness standard.  Similarly, the condemnation of secret rules in Salih and Lumba accords with 
&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚůĂǁƐďĞƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ, as well as the requirement of non-contradiction between 
rules  W and suggests that publication should indeed be a general requirement for administrative rule-
making, not restricted to cases affecting significant interests, nor limited to an obligation to give notice 
to those directly affected.162   
The principle of non-contradiction  W and hence the requirement that administrative rules should be 
consistent with the general law  W also supports the argument that there should be no limits on the 
ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?ability to review the substantive legality of administrative rules.  Rules cannot perform their 
function of guiding official and citizen behaviour if there is doubt about the legality of the advice they 
contain.  The availability of substantive review is further supported by the principles of non-
retrospectivity, performability, and clarity.  Moreover, clarity (in the sense of intelligibility as distinct 
from precision) should be regarded as a requirement of all administrative rules, not merely those 
affecting Convention rights.  Finally, the requirement of constancy might suggest rather stronger 
control over changes to rules than the current law permits.  While Fuller recognised that change must 
be permitted,163 he nevertheless argued that the harm done by too frequent changes is similar to that 
done by retrospectivity, namely, the frustration of expectations formed in reliance on the previous 
law.164  Arguably, therefore, instead of protecting reliance interests only exceptionally via the 
legitimate expectations doctrine, they should be more routinely protected through positive 
obligations on rule-makers, for example to give adequate notice of changes, and/or to make suitable 
transitional provisions.165   
  
                                                          
161 Harlow and Rawlings, above n4, at 232.  See also Perry, above n19, at 379  W 382.  
162 ƵƚĐĨ,ŽŽĚ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ that non-publication might be justifiable where those subject to rules are highly 
opportunistic  W above n145, at 23  W 24. 
163 Above n155, at 44  W 45. 
164 Above n155, at 80. 
165 See Fuller, above n155, at 80; Dotan, above n74, at 38; Williams, above n65, at 654 - 659. 
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2. Rules and Better Government 
&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ŽĨ ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇgo a considerable way towards a bespoke scheme of regulation for 
administrative rule-making, but they are not exhaustive.  In particular, they contain no obvious space 
for procedural obligations beyond notice and publicity requirements.  However, the second rationale 
for rules  W the ability of rule-making processes to take into account a broader range of evidence and 
opinion than is possible in individuated decision-making  W could perhaps found a duty to consult over 
the making and re-making of rules.  It is the expectation that rule-making proceeds on a broad 
evidential base which explains the allocation of rule-making functions to legislative bodies in classic 
separation of powers theory.  While it is clearly unrealistic to expect parliamentary oversight of all 
administrative rule-making, there might therefore be a case for saying that, in order to perform its 
substantive function of improving decision-making quality, administrative rule making ought to follow 
a similarly open and participatory process through consultation. 
As noted above, there is considerable judicial resistance to the imposition of consultation obligations 
on rule-making processes,166 and the academic literature tends to be similarly wary.167  There are three 
main objections: first, that there would be definitional problems in determining when consultation 
obligations were to apply; second, that consultation requirements might be excessively rigid, failing 
to recognise the range of ways in which decision-makers could legitimately seek to inform their rule-
making; and third, that consultation obligations would impose significant costs and burdens on 
administrators, perhaps for little real gain.  The first two objections are valid ones, but they are equally 
applicable to any common law procedural requirements.168  In relation to the rules of natural justice, 
for instance, these problems are dealt with by defining the scope and content of the obligations in 
very general terms.  The real issue, then, is the relative costs and benefits of imposing consultation 
obligations.  Space constraints preclude a detailed exploration of this issue here.  Nevertheless, both 
the widespread use of consultation processes in practice, and the absence of robust empirical 
evidence about their costs and benefits suggest that a duty to consult should not be dismissed out of 
hand.  
Conclusion  
In any area of law it is easier to criticise what currently exists than it is to propose something better.  
In suggesting that a clearer distinction should be drawn between the question whether or not to act 
through rules and the legal consequences of choosing to do so, I have been conscious of two main 
considerations.  One is the difficulty of making any general statements about the respective merits of 
rules and discretion, and therefore the need for great contextual sensitivity in making any judgments 
about the appropriate degree to which administrators should confine or structure their discretion 
through rules.  However, the second is an awareness of the sheer ubiquity of administrative rule-
making, and its potential for abuse if not robustly regulated.  Accordingly, while I have recommended 
                                                          
166 See text accompanying nn103  W 105. 
167 For criticism of compulsory notice and comment procedures for non-legislative rule-making in the US 
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ƐĞĞDŝĐŚĂĞůƐŝŵŽǁ ? ‘EŽŶ-Legislative Rule-DĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĚZĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇZĞĨŽƌŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƵŬĞ>: ? ? ? ?^ĞĞ
also Baldwin, above n13, at 76  W 79, 112  W 113; Cane, above n53, at 106  W 113.  For more sympathetic views, 
see dŽŶǇWƌŽƐƐĞƌ ? ‘dŽǁĂƌĚƐĂƌŝƚŝĐĂůWƵďůŝĐ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƌŝƚ:ŽĨ>ĂǁĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?/ĂŶ,ĂƌĚĞŶĂŶĚEŽƌŵĂŶ
Lewis, The Noble Lie: the British Constitution and the Rule of Law (Harper Collins, 1986) ch 8. 
168 cf Baldwin and Houghton, above n2, at 279. 
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a retreat from judicial control in relation to the first issue  W and in particular abandonment of the no-
fettering rule - I have suggested an extension of judicial control in relation to the second.  
The obvious objections to this approach are that it involves too great a judicial intrusion into the 
administrative process, and that it may still involve insufficient sensitivity to the variety of 
administrative rules.  I would answer this in two ways.  First, if judicial review is to exercise any 
influence over the administrative process beyond the facts of particular cases  W and if judicial 
discretion itself is to be constrained  W it must necessarily operate through general standards which 
will require to be tailored to the specific circumstances in which they are applied.  Second, by drawing 
upon an understanding of the functions of rules to generate standards for regulating the particular 
features of administrative rule-making, I see the role of judicial review as being, not merely to control 
administrative rule-making according to some external standard of fairness or good administration, 
but rather to contribute to the effective realisation of administrative goals by employing regulatory 
standards which ought to make sense to anyone choosing to operate through rules  W and with which, 
for the most part, administrative decision-makers voluntarily comply.  Certainly, there will be times 
when compliance with such standards is irksome to administrators.  Nevertheless, by being 
constrained to follow standards of good rule-making there should be longer term, systemic benefits 
for the overall legitimacy and effectiveness of the administrative process. 
